If you act as an insurance agent in Cyprus, holding an agency agreement is not enough to earn commission on a policy. You have to prove you actually intermediated in concluding that policy, and that proof is a question of fact decided at first instance. Lose the credibility contest in the District Court and an appeal will rarely save you.
That is the practical takeaway from Civil Appeal No. 300/2017 (Supreme Court of Cyprus, Second-Instance Jurisdiction, 21 January 2026), a unanimous judgment delivered by Ioannidis J, sitting with Malachtos and Efraim JJ.
The dispute and the first-instance decision
The claim was, in the Supreme Court's own framing, a simple one.
The appellant, M. Koyrouklas Insurance Agency Ltd, held a licence to operate as an insurance agent. It sued for a specific sum as commission for intermediating in the conclusion of insurance contracts over a three-year period from 1 January 2010, with the Nicosia Race Club as the insured party.
The respondent was Chartis Cyprus Ltd, which had previously operated under the name SJ Zevlaris Insurance Agency Co Ltd. While the appeal was pending, Chartis Cyprus Ltd was renamed AIG Europe SA, and the appeal title was amended accordingly by order of the Supreme Court dated 18 April 2022.
The case was tried in the District Court of Nicosia.
Two contractual anchors were undisputed.
→ An Agency Agreement for General Branch Insurance Business dated 22 February 2008 (Exhibit 1), by which the respondent's general agent appointed the appellant as agent to present and explain insurance contracts on the general agent's behalf, as expressly set out in Appendix A to the agreement.
→ The agreement provided for the agent's remuneration as a specific commission, calculated at the rates recorded in Appendix A. The Supreme Court noted the actual amount of commission did not matter, because the operative issue was whether the appellant had in fact intermediated in concluding the policies.
The appellant claimed commission of €39,437.93 for the conclusion of those contracts.
It was also undisputed that the Nicosia Race Club had invited tenders before the disputed policies were concluded. The relevant document, dated 16 October 2009, was filed as Exhibit 4 and titled "Tenders for the insurance of the property of the Nicosia Race Club."
A separate document dated 17 April 2008, filed as Exhibit 8, recorded that the Race Club, the insured, had appointed Mr M. Kourouklas and/or the appellant to act as its insurance consultant. The letter confirmed the appointment of Mr Marios Kourouklas of M. Koyroyklas Insurance Agency Ltd "as our insurance consultant" as from 16 April 2008.
That dual role sat at the centre of the dispute. The appellant was the Race Club's insurance consultant, and it also held an agency agreement with the insurer.
At trial, two witnesses testified.
→ For the appellant, M. Kourouklas, its founder and managing director.
→ For the respondent, S. Floridis, its director of commercial insurance.
The evidence was directly conflicting. The appellant's position, through its managing director, was that it was entitled to €39,437.93 because Exhibit 4 concerned tenders that "were not open to the public, as they had not been published anywhere, and any tenders sent out were sent through me personally as director of the Plaintiff, which is the exclusive insurance consultant of the Club."
The respondent's position, through its witness, was that the appellant "at no stage of the tender process, from the announcement to the award, acted as an intermediary so as to be entitled to commission under the agency agreement." It added that whatever the appellant did, it did on behalf of the Nicosia Race Club, whose insurance consultant the appellant was.
The first-instance court resolved that conflict against the appellant.
→ It rejected the evidence of the appellant's managing director, who did not make a good impression in the witness box.
→ It did not accept his evidence that the 16 October 2009 document was not "open to the public." The court found that the wording of the document itself defeated his account and rendered it evidence that "lacks persuasiveness and is contrary to logic and human experience."
→ It accepted the evidence of the respondent's director of commercial insurance, who made a good impression as a witness.
The District Court accordingly dismissed the action, with costs against the appellant.
The grounds of appeal
The appellant advanced three grounds.
→ First, that the first-instance court's evaluation of the evidence was defective and/or unreasoned, that it wrongly rejected the evidence of the first plaintiff's witness without any substantial justification, and that it wrongly assessed the meaning of the evidence adduced.
→ Second, that the court reached arbitrary and/or erroneous and/or contradictory and/or mutually conflicting conclusions and findings.
→ Third, related to the second, that the court wrongly dismissed the claim "without findings on the material facts."
The Supreme Court's reasoning
On the first ground, the Court restated a settled principle of Cyprus appellate practice.
The Court then examined the record itself, rather than deferring blindly.
It read the contents of Exhibit 4 and found it was an invitation to all insurance companies to submit tenders, in a specified manner. The document recorded that tenders were sought from insurance companies for the insurance of the Race Club's property, that they had to be in a sealed envelope addressed to the Club, marked with the words "Tender for the Insurance of the Club's Property," and placed in the Club's tender box by no later than noon on Friday 13 November 2009.
Under cross-examination, the appellant's managing director accepted that the tender document did not refer to specific insurance companies, and that it was he who selected the particular companies to which he then communicated the tender document.
The Court also weighed Exhibit 5, a letter from the respondent's general manager dated 13 November 2009, addressed to the Nicosia Race Club, submitting the respondent's tender. That letter made no reference to being submitted through the appellant. It stated that the respondent referred to the announcement and submitted its company's offer "in full conformity with the terms of the tender, including the three-year cooperation period."
Reading the evidence in the light of Exhibit 4 (an open invitation to all insurers) and Exhibit 5 (a direct submission by the insurer, not through the appellant), the Court concluded that the first-instance credibility findings were not contrary to common sense but were reasonable and justified.
→ The appellant therefore failed to discharge the burden of proving an erroneous evaluation.
→ The first ground was rejected as unfounded.
On the second and third grounds, the Court held that whether intermediation by the appellant had taken place, as pleaded, was a question of fact.
Given that the first-instance court had justifiably rejected the managing director's evidence and justifiably accepted the respondent's witness, there could be no finding that the appellant intermediated in concluding the disputed insurance contracts. The conclusion was fully justified by the evidence found credible, citing Pourikkos v. Savva and Others (1991) 1 A.A.D. 507, 516, and by the documents before the court.
There was accordingly no room for any complaint of erroneous or contradictory conclusions. The second and third grounds were also unfounded.
The appeal was dismissed. Costs of €3,250 plus VAT, if any, were awarded in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.
What it means for insurance intermediaries and commercial litigants in Cyprus
The judgment does not announce a new rule. It applies established ones with discipline, and that is precisely why it is useful to practitioners.
For insurance intermediaries, the entitlement to commission under an agency agreement does not crystallise from the contract alone. It depends on proving the factual act of intermediation in concluding the specific policy. The contract sets the rate; the conduct earns the fee.
The dual-capacity problem is the trap. Where the same person acts both as the insured's consultant and as the insurer's agent, acts done for the insured do not automatically count as intermediation earning agency commission. Here, the insurer's tender was submitted directly to the Race Club, not through the agent, and that documentary fact carried weight.
For litigators, the case is a clean illustration of appellate limits in Cyprus. Credibility is decided where witnesses are seen and heard. An appellant who wants the appellate court to reverse a credibility finding carries the burden of showing the assessment was unreasonable, not merely that it was unfavourable. Pleading "arbitrary" or "contradictory" conclusions adds nothing where the trial court's reasoning is grounded in the documents and the accepted testimony.
Practical drafting point: documents win. The tender invitation's own wording and the insurer's direct offer letter did more to sink the claim than any oral testimony. Build the contemporaneous paper trail that proves who intermediated, and do it at the time, not at trial.
Every answer carries its citation. When you need to verify how a Cyprus appellate court treats commission, burden of proof and the limits on disturbing first-instance findings, work from the primary judgment, not a summary.
Research across the Union, settled in seconds, at omnilaw.ai.
FAQ
Did the insurance agent win its commission claim?
No. The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the District Court of Nicosia, which had dismissed the claim with costs. The agent failed to prove it had intermediated in concluding the disputed insurance contracts.
Why did holding an agency agreement not guarantee the commission?
Because the operative issue was factual, not contractual. The agreement of 22 February 2008 set the commission rates, but commission was payable only if the agent in fact intermediated in concluding the specific policies. Whether that intermediation occurred was a question of fact, and on the evidence the court found it had not.
On what basis did the Supreme Court refuse to overturn the first-instance findings?
Assessment of credibility is the task of the trial court, which sees and hears the witnesses. The appellate court intervenes only for specific reasons. Reading the evidence alongside the tender invitation (Exhibit 4) and the insurer's direct offer letter (Exhibit 5), the Court found the first-instance findings reasonable and justified, so the appellant had not discharged its burden of showing an erroneous evaluation.
What was the significance of the agent's dual role?
The agent was both the Nicosia Race Club's insurance consultant and the insurer's agent. The respondent argued that the agent's actions were taken on behalf of the Club rather than as intermediation earning agency commission. The insurer's tender was submitted directly to the Club, not through the agent, which supported the conclusion that no commission-earning intermediation took place.
