A client calls on Monday morning. The Supreme Court annulled an administrative decision against them two years ago. The administration has not complied. They want damages. The question that will determine whether their civil action succeeds is not whether they won the annulment — it is whether they can prove that the harm they suffered was the direct consequence of the act that was annulled. Cyprus Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 93/2018, 9 January 2026 makes that requirement precise.
The Facts in Brief
Two Cypriot police officers — Ioannis Kakofengitis and Christos Hatzitheoduolou — were posted in early 2003 to the Republic's diplomatic mission in Moscow, to process Schengen visa applications under obligations arising from the Schengen Treaty. They arrived at the mission on 10 February 2003. By 2 April 2003, they had received notice that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was terminating their posting effective 30 April 2003.
The Ombudsman intervened and found the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had no competence to terminate the posting — only the Council of Ministers could do so. The Council of Ministers duly issued its own termination decision, giving it retrospective effect to 30 April 2003.
The officers challenged that decision before the Supreme Court in Review No. 12/04. The Supreme Court annulled it on 14 December 2004. The state appealed; the Full Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (Review Appeal No. 3919) on 14 June 2007. The Council of Ministers then issued a fresh decision on 24 October 2007 (No. 66.189). The officers challenged that decision in Review No. 175/08. The Supreme Court annulled it as well, on 16 January 2009, on the basis that a prior annulment operates ex tunc and erga omnes, rendering the original decision legally non-existent, and that the Council of Ministers was required to reopen the file from scratch rather than modify a legally non-existent act.
In August 2009, the officers wrote to the administration claiming damages under Article 146(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The administration did not satisfy the claim. They filed civil actions in the Nicosia District Court, each claiming €230,430 in salary differential losses plus amounts for relocation costs. The trial court dismissed both actions. The officers appealed. On 9 January 2026, the Court of Appeal (Kitsios, Pikis, and Drousiotis JJ, unanimous, judgment delivered by Drousiotis J) dismissed the appeal.
Article 146(6): The Constitutional Damages Route
Article 146(6) of the Cyprus Constitution gives a person whose rights were violated by an administrative decision, act, or omission that has been declared void under Article 146(4) the right to seek damages or other relief before the ordinary civil courts. The right applies where the administration has not voluntarily satisfied the claim following annulment.
As the Court of Appeal confirmed, citing Savvas & Leonidas Motors Ltd v. Attorney General of the Republic (2012) 1 AAD 795, the right to bring that civil action is conditional on three procedural steps:
→ First, the claimant must hold an annulment decision in their favour from the Supreme Court.
→ Second, they must have approached the administration for satisfaction of their claim and compliance with the annulment decision.
→ Third, if the administration has not complied, they may bring a civil action before the competent District Court.
The Article 146(6) right has been characterised in the case law as a sui generis cause of action, entirely independent of any common-law tort. The measure of compensation is not restitutio ad integrum — full restoration — as under English tort law. It is described as "fair and reasonable compensation" (δίκαιη και εύλογη αποζημίωση), a standard that takes the relative fault of each party into account and is calibrated to the relationship between the citizen and the administration. The court cited Andreas N. Loizou, "The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus", p. 360 and Savvas & Leonidas Motors Ltd (above) for this characterisation.
The Two-Stage Test
The court articulated the test as two distinct inquiries.
Stage one: unlawfulness. The civil court takes the annulment as conclusive evidence that the administration acted unlawfully. It does not revisit the grounds of annulment, reweigh the administrative merits, or form its own view on whether the administration should have acted differently. As the court confirmed, citing Kentiki Trapeza Kyprou v. Charis Theodouridis (1993) 1 AAD 420 and Attorney General v. Charalambos Taliadoros et al. (2005) 1 AAD 586, the illegal conduct of the administration is established exclusively by the Supreme Court's annulment — administrative review being the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Stage two: causation and loss. The claimant must demonstrate (a) that the damage they claim to have suffered was caused by the annulled act, or arose as its direct consequence; and (b) the quantum of that loss, proved with the strictness applicable to special damages. The civil court does not ask whether the administration acted wrongly — that is already answered. It asks whether the specific harm the claimant suffered flows from that wrong.
From Attorney General v. Taliadoros (above): "The failure to eliminate the annulled act does not of itself constitute proof of damage. Damage must be proved. It consists of the loss or harm that the claimant suffers by reason of the act that constitutes the actionable cause."
What the Court of Appeal Held
The first and second grounds of appeal argued that the trial court had overstepped by commenting that the annulment decisions had been made on procedural rather than substantive grounds — and that this observation caused it to dismiss the claims. The Court of Appeal disagreed.
The trial court's references to the annulments being on procedural grounds were, in the appellate court's analysis, simply a description of what the Supreme Court had done — not an independent examination of the administrative merits. In the first annulment, the Supreme Court had voided the retrospective termination because it should have been annulled in its entirety once retroactivity was found unlawful. In the second, the Supreme Court had held that the Council of Ministers could not modify a legally non-existent act and was required to start fresh. Neither decision addressed whether the posting itself was justified.
That distinction mattered to the causation analysis. To assess whether the claimed loss — the salary differential and allowances the officers would have received if they had remained in Moscow — was caused by the annulled act, the trial court had to examine whether, had the administration acted lawfully, the officers would in fact have returned to Russia. It found they would not have. A letter from the Chief of Police dated 10 December 2003 — to whom the officers were subordinate — had already requested the termination of all detached police officers from diplomatic missions, citing understaffing. A new Cyprus-Russia agreement came into force on 1 January 2004 under which only transferred (not detached) officers of the Republic would be stationed in Russia; no police officers were detached under it. The trial court concluded that on any reconsideration of the administrative decisions, the outcome for the officers would have been the same.
On the third and fourth grounds — that the trial court had assessed the evidence incorrectly and imposed too high a burden — the Court of Appeal applied the established principle that it does not ordinarily interfere with a trial court's assessment of witness evidence, citing Giallouros et al. v. Psyllou (2009) 1 AAD 1552. The trial court's rejection of the appellants' testimony about hardship and loss was found to be fully reasoned and not contrary to the accepted evidence.
On the fifth ground — concerning the claimed salary differential of €230,430 per officer — the Court of Appeal confirmed that special damages must be pleaded with particularity, recorded in written submissions in detail, and proved with strictness and precision, citing Jamal Ismail v. Michail Antoniou et al. (2014) 1 AAD 347. The officers had not signed any agreement with the administration specifying the duration of their posting. No evidence established what overseas allowance they would have received. The only document touching on duration was a draft (Exhibit 5) that had not been finalised. The officers' own testimony amounted to no more than references to their statements of claim.
The appeal was dismissed with costs of €4,000 plus VAT awarded against the appellants.
Practitioner Implications
This decision is most useful to practitioners advising a client who has won an annulment but has not yet brought civil proceedings for damages. The ruling confirms what the law required but makes the two-stage structure explicit and applies it to a fact pattern where the procedural and substantive dimensions of an annulment diverge.
The action checklist after a successful annulment:
→ Send a formal letter to the administration claiming damages under Article 146(6) and demanding compliance. This is a pre-condition to the civil action, not a formality.
→ Do not assume the annulment carries the damages claim with it. The annulment establishes unlawfulness. Loss must be independently proved.
→ Build the causation chain before issuing. The question is: what would have happened if the administration had acted lawfully? If the answer is "the same outcome" — as it was here because of the Chief of Police's letter and the new Russia-Cyprus agreement — the claim will fail at the second stage regardless of how many annulments preceded it.
→ Particularise special damages from the outset. Salary loss, allowance loss, and relocation costs are special damages in this jurisdiction. They must be itemised in the statement of claim, supported in written submissions with specifics, and proved at trial with evidence that connects each line item to the annulled act. General testimony that "my losses are in my statement of claim" will not suffice.
→ Gather contemporaneous records. Duration of posting, applicable allowance scales, and salary tables current at the time of the unlawful termination — not at the time of trial — are the foundation of any quantum case.
The ruling also signals to practitioners representing the state that the administration's position after an annulment matters to the damages analysis. Where evidence establishes that the administration would have reached the same outcome for independent lawful reasons — a superior authority's request, a change in the relevant legal framework — that evidence goes directly to the causation element and can defeat the claim without disturbing the annulment.
FAQ
Q: Does winning a Supreme Court annulment in Cyprus automatically entitle the claimant to damages from the Republic?
A: No. Under Article 146(6) of the Cyprus Constitution, the annulment establishes that the administration acted unlawfully. It does not prove that the claimant suffered damage as a consequence. Damage must be separately proved by evidence and must be shown to be the direct result of the annulled act. As confirmed in Civil Appeal No. 93/2018, the civil court does not reopen the administrative merits — but it does examine causation and quantum independently.
Q: Can the civil court examine the grounds for the Supreme Court annulment when assessing damages?
A: The civil court cannot revisit the administrative merits or decide for itself whether the administrative act was lawful. Those questions belong exclusively to the Supreme Court in its judicial review jurisdiction. However, the civil court can — and in this case did — examine the content and effect of the annulment decisions in order to assess whether the claimant's loss was the direct consequence of the annulled act. Noting that an annulment was on procedural rather than substantive grounds is not equivalent to re-examining the merits.
Q: What standard of proof applies to special damages in an Article 146(6) claim?
A: Special damages must be pleaded with particularity in the statement of claim, detailed in written submissions, and proved at trial with strictness, clarity, and specific supporting evidence. Citing Jamal Ismail v. Michail Antoniou et al. (2014) 1 AAD 347, the Court of Appeal confirmed that vague references to the statement of claim or unparticularised testimony do not meet the required standard.
The full text of Civil Appeal No. 93/2018, the Article 146(6) case law it cites, and the Cyprus constitutional provisions are searchable in the OmniLaw corpus at omnilaw.ai.
