A tenant in a commercial rent dispute cannot use a cross-examination request during stay of execution proceedings to extract testimony on matters the opposing witness never addressed. The Cyprus Rent Control Court (Paphos Section) confirmed that principle on 9 January 2026 in L.M. Koniotis Investments Ltd v. Enigma Advertising Ltd, Application K10/2024, Cyprus Rent Control Court (Limassol-Paphos), Paphos Section, President Chr. Ragouzaios. The ruling confirms that Rule K.32.6 of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023 preserves the longstanding position: cross-examination of deponents in interlocutory applications is an exceptional procedural step, wholly within the court's discretion, requiring genuine contradictions or ambiguities in the sworn evidence rather than a general desire to challenge credibility or probe unaddressed ground.
The ruling matters immediately for any practitioner handling Cyprus interlocutory proceedings. It confirms that the 2023 procedural reform has not liberalised the cross-examination threshold in non-trial hearings. Pre-2023 case law on the former Order 39, Rule 1 continues to bind Cyprus courts under the new rules, and a cross-examination request that serves delay or targets matters the witness never addressed will be dismissed with a costs order.
Background: A Commercial Rent Increase and Its Aftermath
The underlying dispute in Application K10/2024 concerned commercial premises in Paphos owned by L.M. Koniotis Investments Ltd, a Nicosia company. Enigma Advertising Ltd, a Limassol company, occupied the premises as tenant. The main application was brought under the Rent Control Law to determine the fair rent of the commercial lease.
The tenant's failure to file a timely Response produced a judgment on 23 April 2025 increasing the monthly rent from €1,250 to €2,578, with effect from 11 November 2024. Costs were awarded against the tenant.
On 26 June 2025 the tenant filed a stay of execution application. During that hearing, the tenant filed a further sub-application on 20 October 2025, seeking permission to cross-examine the landlord's witness, Δ.Κ. (the landlord's director), on her sworn declaration of 3 October 2025, filed in support of the landlord's objection to the stay. The two topics targeted were: why the tenant was using the leased premises without a planning permit, and why the landlord had not produced evidence of its financial position to prove solvency.
Rule K.32.6 and the Continuity Principle
The governing provision is Rule K.32.6(1) of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023: "When at a hearing other than a trial, written evidence is given by sworn statement, any party may apply to the court for leave to cross-examine the person giving the evidence."
That text mirrors the former Order 39 (Δ.39), Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which permitted the court or a judge, on the request of either party, to order the attendance of a deponent for cross-examination at an application hearing. Judge Ragouzaios confirmed the continuity principle in clear terms: where the new rules replicate the substance of the old rules, prior case law on those provisions remains binding.
Three Decisions That Define the Threshold
The court's analysis in Koniotis v. Enigma draws on three binding Cyprus decisions, each cited and applied directly by Judge Ragouzaios.
The first is Λευτέρης Μήλος & Πανίκος Χατζηλοίζου, (2008) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 280. That decision confirmed that the court retains its discretion to refuse a cross-examination request even where the opposing party agrees to it. Consent does not transform cross-examination from an exceptional procedural step into a matter of procedural right.
The second is Αίτηση Rana Wahed Ali (Αρ.1), (2004) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 1660. The court there confirmed that the matter is governed by the discretion provision (then Order 39, Rule 1) and that the criteria for exercising that discretion are drawn from English law. That cross-reference to English practice is deliberate and remains operative under Rule K.32.6.
The third, and most directly on point, is Κούππας ν. Πουλλάς Τσαδιώτης Λτδ κ.α., (2014) 1(Β) ΑΑΔ 1665, itself an interim injunction application. That decision states two principles the court applied directly in Koniotis. First, cross-examination in interlocutory proceedings is "rarely given" because the court does not go into the merits, does not examine disputed facts, and does not assess witness credibility at that stage. Second, a mere challenge to the facts or assertions in a deponent's sworn declaration, including a credibility challenge, does not constitute the "good reason" (καλό λόγο) required for leave to be granted.
Halsbury's: The English Authority on Delay and Sufficiency
The court also invoked Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, Vol. 21, para. 878, which formulates the English discretion principle as follows: the court "will not allow a motion to stand over in order to enable a party to examine a witness viva voce if it considers that the application is made in order to create delay or that there is sufficient evidence before it to enable it to deal with the motion."
Two independent grounds for refusal emerge from that passage. First, the presence of a delay motive. Second, the sufficiency of the existing evidence to resolve the interlocutory application without further examination. Judge Ragouzaios found both grounds present on the facts of Koniotis.
Why the Tenant's Application Failed
The court's rejection of the tenant's request rested on a single, fundamental finding. The tenant was not seeking to cross-examine on evidence the witness had actually given. It was attempting to ask about matters Δ.Κ. had not addressed at all in her sworn declaration.
That is not what cross-examination in interlocutory proceedings is for. Its purpose is to test the evidence that has been given, not to generate new testimony on matters outside the declaration. The court characterised the tenant's request as an attempt to create new, unrelated evidence through the cross-examination mechanism, which lies outside the proper scope of Rule K.32.6.
The second line of inquiry raised a separate problem. In a stay of execution application, the applicant (the tenant) bears the burden of establishing its own solvency first. Cross-examining the landlord about her financial position, before demonstrating its own solvency, was an attempt to reverse that burden through procedural manoeuvre. The court identified this and declined to permit it.
The court found no "good reason" for granting the application. Granting it would cause delay in determining the stay, wasting court time and generating unnecessary costs. The application was dismissed, with costs of €350 plus VAT awarded against the tenant.
Practitioner Implications
Koniotis v. Enigma establishes four operative principles under Rule K.32.6 of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023 for practitioners in Cyprus interlocutory proceedings.
Cross-examination requires targeting. The application must identify the specific paragraphs of the sworn declaration and the specific contradictions or ambiguities within them. A request that does not specify what is contested and why it cannot be resolved from the existing statements will not establish good reason.
Consent is irrelevant to the discretion. Even where the opposing party agrees to cross-examination, the court under Rule K.32.6 retains full power to refuse. The court's discretion is not extinguished by agreement.
Cross-examination cannot open new ground, and delay is an independent refusal ground. A Rule K.32.6 application may not probe matters the witness never addressed; and consistent with the English authority adopted in Cyprus, a request that would delay determination of the interlocutory application can be refused on that basis alone.
For the full text of the ruling in Application K10/2024, Cyprus Rent Control Court (Paphos Section), 9 January 2026, and the complete text of Rule K.32.6 of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023, together with the Cyprus cases cited by Judge Ragouzaios, the OmniLaw corpus at omnilaw.ai indexes Cyprus court judgments, procedural rules, and legislation in full. Every answer carries its citation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does Rule K.32.6 of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023 require for a cross-examination order in Cyprus interlocutory proceedings?
Rule K.32.6(1) of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023 allows any party to apply for leave to cross-examine a deponent who gave evidence by sworn statement in a non-trial hearing. The court confirmed in Application K10/2024 (9 January 2026) that leave is not granted as of right: the applicant must show "good reason," meaning clear, material, and specific contradictions or ambiguities in the sworn evidence that cannot be resolved from existing statements. General factual disagreement does not reach that threshold.
Does the opposing party's consent to cross-examination oblige the court to grant it?
No. Λευτέρης Μήλος & Πανίκος Χατζηλοίζου, (2008) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 280 confirmed that the court retains its discretion to refuse cross-examination even where the opposing party agrees to it. The ruling in Application K10/2024 reaffirmed that position under Rule K.32.6 of the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023. Consent does not convert an exceptional remedy into a procedural entitlement.
Can a party use a cross-examination request to ask about matters the witness never addressed?
No. The court in Application K10/2024 explicitly rejected an application that sought to probe topics on which the deponent had given no testimony. Cross-examination in interlocutory proceedings is directed at testing what has been said in the sworn declaration. It cannot be used to generate new testimony on unaddressed matters. Any attempt to use the mechanism to create fresh evidence on collateral issues will be dismissed.
Does pre-2023 Cyprus case law on cross-examination still apply under the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023?
Yes. Judge Ragouzaios confirmed in Application K10/2024 (9 January 2026) that where the New Civil Procedure Rules 2023 replicate the substance of the former rules, prior case law remains binding. Rule K.32.6 mirrors the former Order 39 (Δ.39), Rule 1, and the pre-2023 authority, including Αίτηση Rana Wahed Ali (Αρ.1), (2004) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 1660 and Κούππας ν. Πουλλάς Τσαδιώτης Λτδ κ.α., (2014) 1(Β) ΑΑΔ 1665, applies without modification.
